Franklin v. Rose’s Empirical Analysis
811 F.2d 322 · 1987
Citation profile
38 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently April 2021 · most notably James David Carter v. Ricky Bell, Warden Paul Summers, Attorney General (2000), Levine v. Torvik (1993)
38 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Rose v. Lundy · Sandstrom v. Montana · Picard v. Connor · Anderson v. Harless · Baskett v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'the same fact scenario' " as the federal constitutional claim for which he seeks habeas relief. Shoultes v. Laidlaw, 886 F.2d 114 , 117 (6th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). Clearly, "the habeas petitioner must present his claim to the state courts as a federal constitutional issue--not merely as an issue arising under state law.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The more specific the description of the right in question — e.g., assistance of counsel, double jeopardy, self-incrimination — the more easily alerted a court will be to consider a constitutional constraint couched in similarly specific terms. The greatest difficulty arises when in the state court the petitioner has described his claim in very broad terms, such as denial of a “fair trial.” The concept of fairness embraces many concrete notions, ranging from such fundamental matters as the right of the defendant to know the charges against him, to such lesser interests as his right to have each count of the indictment charge him with no more than one criminal violation, or the right to have access to reports by informant witnesses to law enforcement officials, or the right to present information in mitigation of punishment before being sentenced after conviction. Obviously not every event in a criminal proceeding that might be described as “unfair” would be a violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution. In order to determine, therefore, whether a claim that the defendant has been denied a “fair trial” involves a constitutional claim, one must look to the factual allegations supporting the claim. Some will be of patently constitutional dimension. If the defendant claimed that he was accused of one crime but convicted of an entirely different crime and hence was denied a fair trial, no reasonable jurist would doubt that the defendant’s claim implicated his consti”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“To fairly present his constitutional argument to the state courts required more than the use of a generalized catch-all phrase which merely alleged the deprivation of a fair trial under the United States Constitution. Such a catch-all provision does not adequately apprise the state courts of the constitutional theory to be relied upon at appellate review, especially under circumstances where the only legal theory presented to the state courts was predicated entirely upon state evidentiary law”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Sanborn v. Parker
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.