State v. Harrell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

76 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wells · State v. Thompson

2. “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Stacker · 858 So. 2d 80 - State v. Bradley

3. “The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of • the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); State v. Ortiz, 96-1609 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 922, 930 , cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943 , 118 S.Ct. 2352 , 141 L.Ed.2d 722 (1998); State v. Barnes, 98-932 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2/10/99), 729 So.2d 44, 46 , writ denied, 99-1018 (La. 9/17/99), 747 So.2d 1099 . Under Jackson , a review of a criminal conviction record for sufficiency of evidence does not require a court to ask whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, 729 So.2d at 46 . A reviewing court is required to consider the whole record and determine whether a rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. State v. Harrell, 01-841, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 1015, 1018 . 1 TfiThus, other than ensuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson, “the appellate court should not'second-guess the credibility determination of • the trier of fact,” but rather, it should defer to the rational credibility and evi-dentiary determinations of the jury. State v. Ryan, 07-504, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268, 1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 224 So. 3d 1061 - State v. Dowden · 202 So. 3d 593 - State v. Lapoint