Bonine v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
May 2006
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Burks v. United States · Duncan v. State of Louisiana · Yates v. United States · Griffin v. United States · 491 So. 2d 1129 - State v. DiGuilio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an ovenohelming evidence test. Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence. The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on the state. If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“A witness observed the defendant's vehicle "weaving in front of him" to such an extent that the witness dropped back, only to observe the defendant's vehicle further up the road stopped by the side of the highway about a quarter of a mile beyond the accident scene where it had run into a concrete sign/bench. The witness saw a motorcycle on the ground and the body of the victim lying in the ditch. The motorcycle had been rear-ended. The witness then observed appellant staggering back toward the scene of the accident and heard him admit that he had hit the motorcyclist but thought it was a deer. An officer described the defendant as "smelling of alcohol" and as having slurred speech. Further, defendant admitted to having consumed beer on the day in question and his blood-alcohol level was .226.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“In order to receive the presumption instruction the State must first prove the alternative theory for conviction, unlawful blood alcohol level. If the State proves this theory, then proving impairment is surplusage and the presumption instruction is redundant. On the other hand, if the State fails to prove an unlawful blood alcohol level, then the presumption, even if the instruction is given, does not come into play.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.