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← 812 F.2d 196 - United States v. Colunga

United States v. Colunga’s Empirical Analysis

812 F.2d 196 · 1987

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
5
states following
September 2016
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently September 2016 · most notably United States v. Vontsteen (1992), United States v. Pimienta-Redondo (1989)

22 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

1601987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · United States v. DiFrancesco · United States v. Goodwin · Ex parte Lange · Chaffin v. Stynchcombe

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. [N]either at the time the increased sentence was imposed upon Pearce, nor at any stage in this habeas corpus proceeding, has the State offered any reason or justification for that sentence beyond the naked power to impose it....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant ..., the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.