812 F. Supp. 558 - Golson-El v. Runyon’s Empirical Analysis
1993
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently January 2012
6 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 706 · 29 U.S.C. § 794
Relies on Doe v. New York University · Hartford Fire Insurance v. California · Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad · Strathie v. Department of Transportation · Fuller v. Frank
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Of course, the plaintiff would not be subject to the Last Chance Agreement but for her alcoholism. The plaintiff, however, was fired because she breached the Last Chance Agreement, not because she was an alcoholic. To attribute the firing to alcoholism is defective reasoning that skips the key step of reality, i.e., the prior accommodation to alcoholism by the Last Chance Agreement. Such defective reasoning would render Last Chance Agreements nugatory, because every breach could be attributed to a development connected to an alcoholic's problems. The Last Chance Agreement was a reasonable accommodation. Its lines were bright and strict. Plaintiff crossed those lines. In fairness to the employer and other alcoholics who will need Last Chance Agreements, I will not discourage their use by making their terms meaningless.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[For purposes of establishing a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, t]he plaintiff must show that she was terminated from the position solely by reason of her handicap. Termination of any employee 'which is justified as being due to absenteeism shown to be caused by substance abuse is termination "solely by reason of”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“that substance abuse' for statutory purposes.... An employer does not 'rely' on a handicap, however, when it can point to behavior that is not causally related to that handicap as the reason for the termination.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.