813 So. 2d 1262 - State v. Davies’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “indicates a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Edwards · State v. Walter

2. “The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Bosley, 29,253 (La.App. 2d Cir.04/02/97), 691 So.2d 347 , writ denied, 97-1203 (La.10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1333 . The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Owens, 30,903 (La. App. 2d Cir.09/25/98), 719 So.2d 610 , writ denied, 98-2723 (La.02/05/99), 737 So.2d 747 . .... The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975); State v. Dean, 528 So.2d 679 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1988). In reviewing the correctness of such a determination, this court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to see if the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State v. Hui”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 4 So. 3d 189 - State v. Stipe

3. “To guide courts in the meaning of “same offense,” the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), provided a test: “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether those are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” In other words, if one of the statutes require proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions. The Blockburger test was held to be constitutionally required by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), and is embodied in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 596. In addition to the “Blockburger ” test, Louisiana requires a “same evidence” analysis. State v. Vaughn, supra; State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175 (La.1980). Under the same evidence test, offenses are deemed identical for purposes of double jeopardy where the evidence required to support the conviction on one charge is sufficient to support a conviction on the other. The same evidence test focuses on the proof necessary to convict rather than the actual evidence presented. State v. Steele, supra. Blockburger provides the initial test for determining whether two or more offenses are, in the abstract, considered the same for double | ¿¿jeopardy purposes. The crimes of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyer