813 So. 2d 562 - Bowie v. Young’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In describing the circumstances under which a JNOV is appropriate, the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the procedure is to be used only when the facts and circumstances favor one party so overwhelmingly that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, 583 So.2d 829 . It is inappropriately used in cases in which the evidence merely preponderates in favor of the moving party. Id. Also, we are mindful that the motion must not be granted if there is evidence in opposition that is of such quality and weight that it would permit “reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial just” to reach different conclusions. Id. at 832 . Finally, the court cautioned that, in weighing whether a JNOV is appropriate, the court should not weigh witness credibility and should resolve all reasonable inferences/factual questions in favor of the non-moving party. Id. See also Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-0445 (La.11/28/00); 774 So.2d 84 . On review, an appellate court employs a two-part inquiry when considering whether a JNOV is appropriate. Davis, 00-0445; 774 So.2d 84 . First, applying the same criteria as the trial court, the appellate court must determine if the trial court erred in granting the motion. Id. Next, if the appellate court determines that the standard was correctly applied to the jury verdict at the trial level, the appellate court must then review the JNOV granted using the manifest error standard of revi”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lastrapes v. Progressive Security Insurance Co. · Brack v. Ferrington

2. “Damages awarded after a motion for JNOV is granted are subject to the following guidelines: Once a trial court has concluded that JNOV is warranted because reasonable men could not differ on the fact that the award was either abusively high or abusively low, it must then determine what is the proper _Jjjamount of damages to be awarded. In making this determination, the judge is not constrained as the courts of appeal are to raising (or lowering) the award to the lowest (or highest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded the court. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976). [[Image here]] The appellate court, in determining whether the trial court erred in granting the JNOV as to quantum, once again uses the criteria set forth in [Scott v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 496 So.2d 270 (La.1986) ], i.e., could reasonable men in the exercise of impartial judgment differ as to the fact that the jury award was either abusively high or abusively low. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the trial court erred in granting the JNOV, and the jury’s damage award should be reinstated. On the other hand, if the answer is in the negative, then the trial court properly granted the JNOV, and its damage award based on its independent assessment of the damages is the judgment of the trial court which is reviewed on appeal under the constraints of Coco [v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976) ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 104 So. 3d 567 - Savant v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. · 6 So. 3d 352 - Smoot v. Hernandez

3. “Although the article is silent regarding dismissed, non-negligent Defendants, we believe that it is illogical to consider these parties in the allocation of fault when it has previously been determined that they did not cause or contribute to the injury as required by the article. Further, such a reading of the article would result in the possibility of penalizing the Plaintiff by forcing the allocation of fault to non-negligent previously dismissed parties thereby reducing her recovery. Such an application of the law would be absurd. The very nature of Louisiana tort law centers around the principle that every person is responsible for the damage he causes by his negligence. La.Civ.Code art. 2316. Conversely, one may logically deduce that a non-negligent party is not responsible for damages that he does not cause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 866 So. 2d 837 - Duzon v. Stallworth