Fly v. Cannon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The material facts are virtually undisputed. Plaintiffs are the parents of David Fly, who was killed on October 20, 1989, when he was shot with a .44 magnum handgun by defendant, Michael Joseph Cannon. Defendant Butts is the grandmother of Cannon and the deceased. The boys were first cousins and best friends. Cannon’s parents were killed in an automobile accident when he was approximately three years of age and defendant Butts became his court appointed legal guardian. Ms. Butts provided a home for Cannon and his older sister. Cannon became 18 years of age on June 14, 1989, approximately four months prior to the October 20th incident resulting in the death of Fly. When Cannon became 18 years of age, the legal guardianship was terminated and all guardianship assets were transferred to Cannon. For a short time after Cannon reached the age of 18, he continued to live in a wing of Ms. Butts’ house, somewhat separate from the main part of the house. From an early age, Cannon had been interested in guns and hunting and had taken a hunter’s safety course when he was in sixth grade. In addition to the .44 magnum involved in this lawsuit, he owned a 12 gauge Browning shotgun, a 12 gauge Marlon goose gun, a Winchester 22 rifle, a muzzle loader, a Savage 270 deer rifle, a Baretta 9 millimeter pistol and a Swedish Mouser rifle. He also owned a bullet making machine. Most of the guns Cannon owned were inherited from his father. Two of his guns were purchased by Ms. Butts with Cannon’s fun”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fly v. Cannon

2. “The test of liability under the law of intervening cause requires a person to anticipate or foresee what usually will happen. It does not require him to anticipate and provide against what is unusual or unlikely to happen, or that which is remotely possible, but whether it was probable according to the usual experience of persons. Moody v. Gulf Refining Company, 142 Tenn. 280 , 218 S.W. 817 , 8 A.L.R. 1243 ; Moyers v. Ogle, 24 Tenn.App. 682 , 148 S.W.2d 637 ; Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392 , 192 S.W.2d 840, 852 , 164 A.L.R. 364 ; Rader v. Nashville Gas Co., 37 Tenn. App. 621 , 268 S.W.2d 114 ; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 111, pp. 685, 699, 700. In Moody v. Gulf Refining Company, supra, the Court said: “An injury that is the natural and probable consequence of an act of negligence is actionable, and such an act is the proximate cause of the injury. But an injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever, of the injury.” Applying the foregoing rule to the facts alleged in the declaration and allowing every intendment in their favor, as we are required to do in testing the declaration by demurrer, we think that the mere possibility of either defendant foreseeing or anticipating the tragic consequences of Sawyer’s acts was so remote, unreasonable and improbable as to leave no room for speculation. Finally, conceding that Baker w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fly v. Cannon