¶1concurring.
¶2I concur in the majority’s opinion to the extent that we reverse the trial court’s judgment, reinstate appellant’s causes of action, and remand the cause to the trial court. I write to express my disagreement with the majority’s articulation of six factors to be applied by the appellate court in reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing “death penalty sanctions.” Indeed, I see no reason to reach out to a federal appellate court for direction as does the majority by its reliance on Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3rd Cir.1984). I reason that our own Supreme Court has given us the law applicable to the present case. See Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.1990); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Hence, this court must apply that applicable law, and it is not our judicial function to write a separate test for abuse of discretion in these cases. We are bound by the pronouncements of the Texas Supreme Court on the law until the Court states to the contrary. Jones v. Hutchinson County, 615 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ).
¶3I turn then to address the trial court’s abuse of discretion as I understand the test given us by the Supreme Court. In my view, the sanctions imposed originate in a bitter dispute between attorneys over the drafting and contents of a court order. Furthermore, to my mind, the trial court’s sanction to one attorney’s distainful approach to that order went beyond official judicial disapproval and became a personal matter. Once the trial court’s reaction became personal, the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principals. See Koslow’s, 796 S.W.2d at 704; Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 238. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the present case. Because the trial court abused its discretion under the test given us by the Supreme Court, I conclude that we must reverse the trial court’s judgment, reinstate appellant’s cause of action, and remand the cause to the trial court.