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← 814 F.2d 1169 - Flamm v. Eberstadt

Flamm v. Eberstadt’s Empirical Analysis

814 F.2d 1169 · 1987

Citation profile

84
cited by 84 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
October 2014
most recently cited

54 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 84 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2014 · most notably Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988), DiLeo v. Ernst & Young (1990)

54 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions

3401987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

Relies on TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. · Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States · Gregory v. United States · Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. · Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 84 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The fraud-on-the-market approach relieves the plaintiff of the need to show that he relied on or even read the misleading or incomplete disclosures; he receives a measure of damages based on the premise that actual versus “right” price is the appropriate comparison.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “significantly alter[ing] the 'total mix' of information made available.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[The standard] does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.