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← 815 F.2d 1164 - Clay v. Conlee

Clay v. Conlee’s Empirical Analysis

815 F.2d 1164 · 1987

Citation profile

81
cited by 81 later decisions
3
states following
June 2021
most recently cited

32 federal appellate · 16 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 81 later decisions — most recently June 2021 · most notably Jones v. City of Chicago (1988), Cortez v. McCauley (2007)

32 federal appellate · 16 district · 3 state decisions

32019871990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Kentucky v. Graham · Beck v. State of Ohio · Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati · Baker v. McCollan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “That fact, however, is neither dispositive of nor relevant to the ultimate issue in the case — whether there was probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff for the crime] — since “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 [ 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 ] (1979). [Other citations omitted] The Constitution prohibits only arrests that are not based on probable cause. That standard- was defined by the Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 [ 85 S.Ct. 223 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 ] (1964): Whether [an] arrest was constitutionally valid depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it— whether at that moment the facts and circumstances- within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [person arrested] had committed ... an offense. Id. at 91 , 85 S.Ct. at 225 ; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. [31] at 37, 99 S.Ct. [2627] at 2632 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 343 ] [(1979)].”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[F]or a supervisor to be held liable for the acts of a subordinate, something more must be shown than merely the existence of the supervisor-subordinate relationship.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Suits against officials in their individual capacity “seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 , 105 S.Ct. 3099 , 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). To establish personal liability in a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that the official acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right. Id. [105 S.Ct.] at 3106. Though personal participation is not required for liability to attach, (citations omitted) there is no concept of “supervisory strict liability” in section 1983 actions, (citations omitted).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.