Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

74 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, ANTHONY DEWAYNE HORN, on or about the 15th day of December, 1991, in the County of Burleson, and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment, did then and there intentionally and knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property, to-wit: one Sharp cash register and its contents and with intent to obtain and maintain control of said property, intentionally and knowingly threaten and place David Hood in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, and the said ANTHONY DEWAYNE HORN did then and there intentionally and knowingly use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: one small pistol, a firearm, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated Robbery and so say by your verdict, but if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict “Not Guilty.” If you have found the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated Robbery, and you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged offense or during immediate flight therefrom, you will so state in your verdict.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Biggins v. State · Horn v. State

2. “All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or both. A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. McFarland v. State · Bruton v. State

3. “The State nevertheless contends that since the court charged the jury on the abstract law of parties (although reference was made to “principals” rather than “parties”), and since the jury was instructed to find whether appellant caused the deceased’s death “as a principal,” this was sufficient. We do not agree. This reference to the law of parties, contained in the paragraph applying the law to the facts, was not sufficient to require the jury to find whether Lewis, the driver of the vehicle, caused the deceased’s death and whether appellant was criminally responsible for those acts of Lewis. Nowhere in the charge is the jury required to find that Lewis committed any criminal acts, for which appellant could be held responsible, if at all, because of his encouragement, assistance, etc., of those acts, (emphasis ours)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Chatman v. State