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816 So. 2d 98

Ex Parte Edwards

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided January 12, 2001

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 2001-01-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"(a) Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle, or vessel, as defined in Section 33-5-3, or to the regulation of traffic or boating, shall be guilty of homicide when the violation is the proximate cause of the death."”

quoted by 5 later decisions, including Sullens v. State, Danner v. State

“"`We conclude that the trial court's initial reservations about tying the requisite mental state to the word "unlawfully" were sound. We endorse the "Use Note on Mens Rea Element" that accompanies the Alabama pattern jury instruction applicable to § 32-5A-192; that note states that "unintentional" is not defined in the Code but that the committee drafting the instruction assumes that word to refer to all forms of mens rea except that described by the word "intentional." The Use Note then refers to the previously referenced defined terms governing mens rea elements — "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "criminal negligence."11 Then, the Use Note correctly concludes: "`"The judge should insert the appropriate mens rea element considering the indictment and the evidence before the court. `There are few, if any, strict liability offenses in this Criminal Code....' Ala.Code § 13A-2-3 Commentary. See also § 13A-2-4(b)." "` Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal, 14-4 to 14-6 (3d ed.1994). "`11Because § 32-5A-192(b) uses the word "unintentionally," § 13A-2-2(1), defining "intentionally," has no field of application.'”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Sullens v. State, 879 So. 2d 594 - Harrison v. State

Relies on Ex Parte Harper · 585 So. 2d 261 - Inmon v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2001-01-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2015 · most notably 843 So. 2d 885 - Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos (2003), United States v. Gomez-Leon (2008)

1 federal appellate · 41 state decisions

38020012010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1

¶2I concur in the result of the main opinion; however, I write briefly to explain why I disagree, in part, with the rationale of that opinion.

¶3The main opinion finds error in the failure of the court to instruct the jury "on a culpable mental state" and also appears to conclude that the indictment was fatally flawed because it "did not describe a necessary culpable mental state." 816 So.2d at 109. I do not agree that the indictment was flawed.

¶4The Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the form and content of indictments. Rule 13.2(a), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides:

¶5 "The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise statement of the charge in

*110
ordinary language sufficiently definite to inform a defendant of common understanding of the offense charged and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment."

¶6The appellate courts of this State have held that an indictment is sufficient if it conforms to the language of the statute on which it is based. See Ex parte Harper, 594 So.2d 1181 (Ala. 1991); Inmon v. State,585 So.2d 261 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); see also 1 Hugh Maddox, Alabama Rulesof Criminal Procedure § 13.0 at 427 (3d ed. 1999).

¶7The main opinion considers the "`Use Note on Mens Rea Element' that accompanies the Alabama pattern jury instruction applicable to § 32-5A-192," 816 So.2d at 107, and apparently concludes that the word "unintentionally," appearing in § 32-5A-192, Ala. Code 1975, encompasses the "knowing," "reckless," and "negligent" mens rea elements. I agree with that conclusion.

¶8I believe the indictment conformed to the language of the statute by charging that the defendant had "unintentionally" caused the death of the victim.15 Therefore, I believe the indictment was sufficient to "inform [the] defendant . . . of the offense charged." Rule 13.2(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.

¶9Nonetheless, I concur in the result, because I agree with this conclusion in the main opinion: "Because Edwards was acquitted of both manslaughter (ruling out recklessness) and criminal negligence, the court should have granted Edwards's postjudgment motion for a judgment of acquittal." 816 So.2d at 109.

¶10

15 The indictment stated:

¶11 "The Grand Jury of Covington County charges that before the finding of this indictment, [the defendant] . . . did unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another person, to-wit: George E. Kilcrease, while engaged in the violation of a state law . . . applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, to-wit: passing in a no passing zone and/or speeding, and such violation was the proximate cause of the death of George E. Kilcrease, in violation of Title 32-5A-192 of the Code of Alabama, 1975, and as last amended, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."

¶12(C.R. at 1.) (Emphasis added.)

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