Isbell v. Isbell’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
16 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently September 2011
16 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 53 Tenn. App. 594 - Crouch v. Crouch · Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. · Karrer v. Karrer · Cranford v. Cranford · 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 694 - Shepard v. Henderson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he advent of rehabilitative support did not totally displace permanent alimony; the courts may still award long-term support and maintenance until remarriage or death of the recipient in situations where rehabilitation is simply not feasible. Where rehabilitative support is awarded, it may be made subject to conditions imposed by the court or agreed to by the parties. But where the rehabilitative award has been made for a fixed amount, the award must be considered non-modifiable, even if it is to be paid hi installments and not in a lump sum. The certainty that results from such a rule benefits both parties, allowing each to make long-range financial plans for their own futures and for the future of any children affected by the break-up of the marriage. Unnecessary disruption of financial plans and expectations does not serve the policy fostered by the legislature in its efforts to provide rehabilitation for economically disadvantaged family members faced with marital dissolution. The rule we have recognized today will foster that legislative policy of rehabilitation.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““T.C.A. § 36-5-101, as here applicable, provides as follows: .. .(a)(1) Whether the marriage is dissolved absolutely, or a perpetual or temporary separation is decreed, the court may make an order and decree for the suitable support and maintenance of either spouse by the other spouse, or out of his or her property, and of the children, or any of them by either spouse or out of such spouse’s property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties, the order or decree to remain in the court’s control; and, on application of either party, the court may decree an increase or decrease of such allowance upon upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. ...(d) It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance. Where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in this subsection, then the court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until the death or remarriage of the recipient except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(3). Notwithstanding the provision of (a)(1), our Courts have held that alimony in solido, constituting a lump sum, although payable over a stated period of time, is not subje”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Campbell v. Campbell · Self v. Self“[T]he mere fact that the duration of the specified monthly payments is determined by [the former husband’s life] does not necessarily mean that the provision is subject to modification. The statute, as construed by the Court in Isbell , permits awards that are not subject to modification based on the need for certainty and finality. Susceptibility to modification is not totally dependent upon the duration of payments. Consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), may require or justify definite periodic payments on a long-term basis not subject to modification.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Bryan v. Leach · Self v. Self
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.