Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation State of Arizona v. City of Austin Portland Cement Association’s Empirical Analysis
817 F.2d 1435 · 1987
Citation profile
17 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 31 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2012 · most notably California v. Arc America Corp. (1989), Class
17 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 4 (§ 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Relies on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. · Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin · Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters · Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois · Silkwood v. Corporation
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The Court of Appeals also erred in concluding that state indirect purchaser statutes interfere with accomplishing the purposes of the federal law that we identified in Illinois Brick. First, the Court of Appeals concluded that state indirect purchaser statutes interfere with the congressional purpose of avoiding unnecessarily complicated proceedings on federal antitrust claims. But these state statutes cannot and do not purport to affect remedies available under federal law. * * * * * * Second, the Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing state indirect purchaser claims could reduce the incentives of direct purchasers to bring antitrust actions by reducing their potential recoveries. The presence of indirect purchaser claims would reduce settlement offers to direct purchasers, the Court of Appeals believed, and if the total liability were to exhaust a defendant's assets, the direct purchasers would have to share the defendant's estate in bankruptcy with indirect purchasers. But the Court in Illinois Brick was not concerned with the risk that a plaintiff might not be able to recover its entire damages award or might be offered less to settle ... Illinois Brick was concerned that requiring direct and indirect purchasers to apportion the recovery under a single statute§ 4 of the Clayton Act would result in no one plaintiff having a sufficient incentive to sue under that statute. State indirect purchaser statutes pose no similar risk to the enforcement of the federal law. * * * ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[s]uch statutes are clear attempts to frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick, and, accordingly, are pre-empted by federal law.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“in adopting the offset provision, the district judge forged an equitable solution and did not abuse his discretion,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.