Oldaker v. Peters’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

116 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 116 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In your verdict you must assess a per-eentage of fault to decedent Donnie Frazier whether or not Allen Hilliard was partly at fault, if you believe: First, either: Decedent Donnie Frazier knew, or by the highest degree of care could have known that there was a reasonable likelihood of collision in time thereafter to have stopped, or swerved, but decedent Donnie Frazier failed to do so, and Second, decedent Donnie Frazier, in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph First, was thereby negligent, and Third, such negligence of decedent Donnie Frazier directly caused or directly contributed to cause the death of Donnie Frazier.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Frazier v. Emerson Electric Co. · Klotz v. St. Anthony's Medical Center

2. “Judicial discretion is abused when a trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable men can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion, (citation omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Montgomery v. Clubb · King v. Copp Trucking, Inc.

3. “The trial court’s order [granting summary judgment on behalf of MHTC] failed to state there was “no just reason for delay” as required by revised Rule 74.01 (effective at the time of the order), which governs entry of judgments as to fewer than all claims or parties when multiple claims or parties are involved in the action. In Stemley v. Downtown Medical Building, Inc., 762 S.W.2d 43, 45-46 (Mo. banc 1988), we excused a trial court from stating that there was “no just reason for delay” as required by revised Rule 74.01(b), by holding that the spirit of the rule was satisfied with the court’s designation of its order as final for purposes of appeal, which sufficed under the prior version of Rule 74.01. Stemley was handed down in December 1988, and at the time of the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in the present case in June 1988, plaintiffs could not have been charged with the prescience of anticipating this Court’s ruling on the subject. Stemley proceeded on the basis that the cause was already presented to this Court on appeal and the trial court had designated its order as final for purposes of appeal, which sufficed under the prior rule, amended while the action was pending. The present case was pending when new Rule 74.01 was adopted, and the trial court entered an order after its effective date which was not in compliance with the new rule. Here the parties disagree as to whether the plaintiffs acted improperly in not taking further action to join the Highwa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Oldaker v. Peters