Peters v. City of Shreveport’s Empirical Analysis
818 F.2d 1148 · 1987
Citation profile
48 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 82 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2016 · most notably Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989), McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. (1988)
48 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 29 U.S.C. § 202 · 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 29 U.S.C. § 216 · 29 U.S.C. § 217 · 29 U.S.C. § 255 · 29 U.S.C. § 260
Relies on Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle · International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) Tarleton is subject to the Equal Pay Act; (2) she performed work that required equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and (3) Tarleton paid her less than the male employee providing the basis for comparison.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“As to the Equal Pay Act claims, the burden of proof shifted to the city to establish the application of one of the Act’s four exceptions. As to the Title VII claims, the burden of production shifted to the City to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the wage differential. The burden of persuading the court that the differential was due to the City’s intentional sex discrimination remained with the plaintiffs as to the Title VII claims.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“less than an employee of the opposite sex for substantially equal work, the burden of proof “shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act’s four exceptions.” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. [188], 196 [, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2229 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1 ] ... [(1974) ]; Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir.1983). The Act provides one general and three specific exceptions for disparate wage payments “made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1). These exceptions “are affirmative defenses on which the employer has the burden both of production and of persuasion.” Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1136 (citing Coming Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195-96 [, 94 S.Ct. at 2228-29 ],...”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.