Gonzales v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... before a trial court is allowed to utilize a closed-circuit system of transmitting a child’s testimony into the courtroom, the court must hear evidence and make a case-specific determination that: First, [the] use of the ... procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the ... child; Second ... the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and Third ... the emotional distress suffered by the child ... in the presence of the defendant is ... more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Dufrene v. State · Gonzales v. State

2. “Given the State's traditional and transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children and buttressed by the growing body of academic literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court, we will not second guess the considered judgment of the Maryland Legislature regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional trauma of testifying.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Creekmore v. State · Gonzales v. State

3. “If the legislature had elsewhere clearly expressed a policy that no courtroom testimony should be allowed except in the physical presence of the defendant, I might be inclined to think that Article 38.071 was meant as a list of specific exceptions to that general rule. But, in this instance, the general rule is expressed only in the Constitution, and the legislature has no authority to make exceptions. It follows that Article 38.071 cannot seriously be taken as an attempt by the legislature to prohibit the use of closed-circuit television [testimony] except under the enumerated circumstances. If that were the case, one might have expected it to say so explicitly, rather than to list exceptions against an unarticulated policy. And, although Article 38.071 might actually have been intended to limit the Constitution, it clearly cannot be effective to such end. Consequently, the only permissible interpretation of the statute, no matter how counterintuitive, is that it prescribes a specific alternative testimonial procedure under certain defined circumstances, leaving the courts free to develop different procedures under other circumstances, constrained only by constitutional prohibitions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Marx v. State