Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 819 F.2d 124 - Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co.

Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co.’s Empirical Analysis

819 F.2d 124 · 1987

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
2
states following
January 2018
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently January 2018 · most notably Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enterprises, Inc. (1989), Kerr-Mcgee Corporation v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc., Dorothy E. Lyons, Cross-Appellant v. Kerr-Mcgee Corporation, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc. (1987)

19 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

2501987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 1 U.S.C. § 3 · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 33 U.S.C. § 905

Relies on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki · Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. · Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland · The Osceola · S.S. Zoe Colocotroni v. Puerto Rico

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... We reiterate today when it enacted Sec. 905(b), Congress did not create a new or broader cause of action in admiralty than that which previously existed, but rather, it curtailed available third party tort actions, and in doing so it neither expanded nor constricted maritime jurisdiction. We hold that in order for a waterborne structure to qualify as a “vessel” under Sec. 905(b), it must be a vessel for purposes of maritime jurisdiction. Such a vessel must be capable of navigation or its special purpose use on or in water. We further hold that to be cognizable under Sec. 905(b), a tort must occur on or in navigable waters subject, of course, to the special provisions of the Admiralty Extension Act, and there must be the traditional admiralty nexus.... [Footnotes omitted.]”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We further hold that to be cognizable under § 905(b), a tort must occur on or in navigable waters subject, or course, to the special provisions of the Admiralty Extension Act [ 46 U.S.C. § 740 ], and there must be the traditional admiralty nexus. [citing”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The DAN E. McMAHON was under construction on land at the time of Richendollar's accident. It was not a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts under the long-standing jurisdictional rubric ...”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.