Osterweil v. Bartlett’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 , 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has “attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the court] will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 , 117 S.Ct. 2293 , 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause “embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike eases accordingly” (quotation omitted)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 48 F. Supp. 3d 347 - Aron v. Becker

2. “[requiring documentation enables Defendant to effectively differentiate between individuals who have a bona fide need to carry a concealed handgun for self-defense and individuals who do not. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ argument that many -violent gun crimes, even a majority, are committed by people who cannot legally have guns, and the ongoing dispute over the effectiveness of concealed weapons laws. But under intermediate scrutiny, Defendant’s policy need not be perfect, only reasonably related to a “significant,” “substantial,” or “important” governmental interest. Defendant’s policy satisfies that standard.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Kachalsky v. Cacace

3. “because plaintiff was entitled to challenge the denial of his firearms license application in an Article 78 proceeding, plaintiff had available to [her] a meaningful post-deprivation remedy under state law. See [O’Brien v. Keegan, 87 N.Y.2d 436, 439 , 639 N.Y.S.2d 1004 , 663 N.E.2d 316 (N.Y.1996) ]; see also [Gude-ma v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717 , 725 (2d Cir.1998) ] (noting that an Article 78 proceeding is an adequate state-law remedy). As such, plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due process claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 48 F. Supp. 3d 347 - Aron v. Becker