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82 Cal. 36

People v. Stone

California Supreme Court

Decided December 12, 1889

California Supreme Court · decided 1889-12-12

<p>Criminal Law — Homicide — Self-defense—Forcible Invasion of Possession — Right to Harvest Crop. — The evidence does not warrant a conviction of murder in the second degree, or of any other offense, where it appears that the person accused of murder was, and had been for a number of years, in the actual and peaceable possession of land which he claimed to own, and was about to harvest a crop which he had sown upon the land, when his possession was invaded by deceased, who attempted by force to prevent the harvesting of the crop, claiming that his wife had title to the land, and was shot after placing the lives of the defendant and his son in imminent peril, though it further appears that defendant and deceased had each made threats against the life of the other if he attempted to enter upon the land and cut the grain, and that each went upon the land armed to effectuate his purpose, ancl though it is uncertain whether defendant or deceased fired the first shot. The deceased was the aggressor from the beginning, conceding that his wife had a valid title to the land, since he had no right by force to invade defendant’s possession, or to attempt by force to prevent the harvesting of his crop; and the killing of the deceased by the defendant under the circumstances was justifiable as matter of law. (Beatty, C. J., dissenting, holds that the jury may properly have found the ease to be one of mutual combat, voluntarily entered into under circumstances insufficient to justify either party in a homicide.)</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 1904

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-12-12

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Beatty, C. J., dissenting.

¶1I cannot concur in the view that the verdict of the jury in this case is wholly unwarranted by the evidence.

¶2It is not clear that the defendant, at the time of the homicide, was in the peaceable and exclusive possession of the disputed premises. Deceased, or those he represented, had at least a scrambling possession; not? such a possession, certainly, as would have justified him in resorting to extreme measures in the attempt to defend it, but certainly a show of possession backed by a claim of right. He was standing on the land, at a gap in the fence, where he had gone armed with a deadly weapon, determined to prevent the defendant from entering. The defendant, equally armed and equally determined, *41accompanied by bis son, approached with the manifest purpose of going on the land to harvest the crop. The parties were bitter and open enemies. Each had insulted and threatened the life of the other, and each at the time plainly declared to the other what his present purpose was,—the one to enter, the other to resist his entry. Each also plainly notified the other that he would act at his peril.

¶3Immediately ensuing these mutual threats, pistols were drawn on both sides, and the firing commenced. The preponderance of the evidence certainly is that deceased drew first,—though this is not perfectly clear,-—and all the evidence is that he fired first, though not until defendant’s son was in the act of seizing him.

¶4After the struggle commenced, neither party had an opportunity to withdraw, or to notify his adversary that he declined further contest, and probably neither party desired to do so. The natural md inevitable result was the death of one of the comba. ,nts.

¶5Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the jury may well have found that the case was one of mutual combat, voluntarily entered upon under circumstances insufficient to justify either party, and therefore that the defendant’s plea of self-defense, or defense of his son, could not avail him, he and his son having entirely failed to manifest the slightest wish to withdraw from the combat before its fatal termination.

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