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← 82 Ill. 2d 116 - Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter

82 Ill. 2d 116 - Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter’s Empirical Analysis

1980

Citation profile

76
cited by 76 later decisions
1
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

76 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 76 later decisions — most recently December 2018 · most notably 111 Ill. 2d 350 - Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 105 Ill. 2d 79 - People v. Gaines (1984)

76 state decisions

3501980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dandridge v. Williams · San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez · McGowan v. State of Maryland Gallagher · Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. · Shapiro v. Thompson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The * test in assessing an equal protection claim is to determine if the [statute] * * * operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental right. (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 17 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 33 , 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1288 .) If the legislation in question creates a ‘suspect classification,’ such as race (Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1, 11 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 1017 , 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 ), alienage (Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 , 29 L. Ed. 2d 534,541-42 , 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1851-52 ), national origin (Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U.S. 633, 646 , 92 L. Ed. 249 , 259, 68 S. Ct. 269, 275 ), or infringes upon a fundamental right, such as the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson (1964), 394 U.S. 618, 634-35 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 615 , 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1331-32 ), the right to vote (Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663, 670 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 174 , 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 ), or the right to fair treatment in the criminal process (Douglas v. California (1963), 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 813-14 , 83 S. Ct. 814, 815-16 ), then the statute must promote a compelling or overriding State interest. If a suspect classification or fundamental right is not found, the legislation simply must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 501-03 , 90 S. Ct. 1153, 116”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The first test in assessing an equal protection claim is to determine if [the legislation] *** operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental right. [Citation.] *** If a suspect classification or fundamental right is not found, the legislation simply must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. [Citation.] Under the traditional equal protection standards utilized by both the Federal and State courts, a legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. [Citations.] Thus, the inquiry shifts to an analysis of the legislative purpose and a subsequent determination whether the legislative classification is rationally related to that purpose. [Citation.] Under traditional concepts of equal protection, i.e., when a rational-basis test is used, a legislative classification is presumed valid. [Citations.] The burden of rebutting the presumptive validity of the classification rests upon the party challenging its constitutionality. [Citation.] Finally, a statutory classification will not be declared unconstitutional ‘if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ ” Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d at 119-22 , 412 N.E.2d at 152-54 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.