¶1About the month of May, 1875, the defendant, J. P. Evans, and one M. J. Curtis associated themselves together as partners under the firm-name of J. P. Evans & Co., for the purpose of carrying on a grain and commission business. Evans lived in Council Bluffs, and Curtis at Malvern. The articles of copart-nership required Evans to furnish the money which ■should be necessary to carry on the business properly, and to devote so much of his time and attention to the business as he should see that it required. Curtis was to give all his time and attention to the business at Malvern which should be needed. The profits and losses were to be divided. The eighth paragraph of the articles of copartnership is as follows : ‘ ‘ Eighth. Neither party shall withdraw from the joint stock at any time more than his share of the profits of the business then ■earned.” The partnership thus formed continued until June, 1886, when it was dissolved. The note in suit is dated June 12, 1885 ; is for the sum of seventeen hundred dollars, with interest thereon at ten per cent, per annum, payable to the plaintiff; and is signed by defendants, J. P. Evans & Co., and Munger & Goodwin. The appellants claim that it was not given in the course •of the partnership business, but was made at the instance and for the benefit of Curtis, and that the plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge of that fact when he accepted it. During the time the partnership ■continued the plaintiff was engaged in the banking business at Malvern. The defendants in their counterclaim allege, in effect, that, with actual and constructive notice of all material facts he paid, on checks drawn by Curtis in the firm-name and otherwise, large sums of money for the personal benefit of Curtis, which were wrongfully charged to the firm. Judgment for the 'sums nlleged to have been thus paid, to the amount of thirty-six thousand, five hundred and ninety dollars and twenty-one cents, is demanded against the plaintiff.
¶2The plaintiff admits that he transacted a banking •business with J. P. Evans & Co. through Curtis, but *495■claims that J. P. Evans, with full knowledge of the acts -of Curtis, of which complaint is made, ratified and confirmed them. He further claims that said Evans represented to him that Curtis was fully authorized to sign the firm-name to all checks which were so signed, and 'that, relying upon such representations, he paid them ; that said Evans knew that Curtis would draw and present such checks for payment, and knew the purposes to which the money to be so drawn would be applied ; that with such knowledge he kept silent and permitted the money to be paid; that, after it was so received and used, he acquiesced therein, and waived all right to •complain on account of such payment and use' of the money. The verdict and judgment against defendants were for the sum of eighteen hundred and five dollars .and ninety-five cents, which was the amount due on the note.
¶3I. It appears that, during his partnership with the defendant Evans, Curtis was connected with various
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¶5It is obvious, in view of the practice of the firm, and the rights of Curtis, that the fact that checks were made payable to Curtis and various other persons, instead of to the firm, was not notice to the plaintiff that they were not drawn on account of firm business. The defendant Evans claims that he had no knowledge of the method pursued by Curtis in drawing checks and keeping accounts, but his claim is contradicted by his evidence. When business was brisk, Curtis sent to Evans daily statements on printed blanks, showing the amount of grain purchased, the amount of money paid out, and the balance on hand. At other times the statements were sent, but less frequently.. Evans often visited Malvern, and examined the accounts of the firm, which were kept by Curtis. The books of accounts so kept showed all facts necessary to apprise anyone who examined them of the funds received, and the disposition Curtis was making of them. Evans admits that he examined the books to ascertain what money Curtis was drawing out of the business, but states that he did not know he was drawing out more than his share. It *497thus appears that Curtis had a recognized right to appropriate firm funds to his own use, to a.n amount equal to his share of the profits, and he could properly draw firm checks payable to himself or to others for that purpose. The defendant Evans, after making frequent examination of the books, was unable to tell whether Curtis was drawing more than the amount to which he was entitled, but he now seeks to charge the plaintiff with constructive notice of the facts which he failed to ascertain when he had all necessary means of knowdedge at his command. It is clear that he should not be permitted to succeed in his purpose. He claims that he did not fully understand the books, but we are satisfied that he knew enough of them to be able to ascertain readily whether Curtis was misappropriating funds. If his claim were conceded to be true, the result would be the same, for the jury were fully justified by the evidence in finding that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the alleged misappropriation of funds by Curtis, and that he was not a party to it.
¶6¡ II. Some of the checks in controversy were drawn, and the firm-name affixed thereto, by employes of the
¶7*498III. It is said that it was the duty of the defendant Evans to furnish all money required by the firm; therefore,
¶8IY. The appellants complain that the charge of the court did not properly instruct the jury in regard to
¶9Y. The appellants make and argue at great length numerous objections to rulings of the court on the admission of evidence, to the charge to the jury, and to the verdict. The assignments of error alone cover more than forty printed pages of the record. The questions thus presented are for the most part unimportant, and a due regard for our duty to other litigants forbids a separate mention of each. It is sufficient for us to say *499■that we have examined each objection made, but without finding any adequate ground for reversing the judgment. The court adopted a liberal rule in regard to the admission of evidence. Its charge was quite fair to the appellants. It did not describe particularly the rights of the defendant Evans, considered apart from the firm of which he was a member, but the verdict shows that the omission was without prejudice. The •evidence was ample to sustain the verdict. It is probable the defendant Evans has been wronged by Curtis, but we think the jury were justified in finding that he had so far authorized the acts of Curtis, or ratified them by his conduct, that the plaintiff is not liable for the doss which resulted from them.
¶10The judgment of the district court is affirmed.