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82 Mass. 305

Moore v. Weaver

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided October 15, 1860

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1860-10-15

<p>By a devise to the testator's daughter, “ during the term of her natural life, and after her decease to her children, with liberty to devise the same at her discretion; but if she should decease without any such devise, then my will is, that all her children inherit the same, share and share alike, to them, their heirs and assigns forever; ” aE the chUdren of the daughter, whether born before or after the death of the testator, take vested remainders upon the death of the daughter, if not immediately upon the death of the testator; defeasible by devise,'but not by deed, of the tenant for life; and by virtue of the Rev. Sts. c. 62, § 24, the issue of one of such chUdren who dies after the making of the wiE, and before the death of the testator, take the parent’s share.</p>

Relies on Moore v. Dimond

Decided 1860-10-15

Bigelow, C. J.

¶1By the will of Hannah Martin, her daughter took a life estate only in the real estate of which the testatrix died seised, and the remainder vested in fee simple in the daughter’s children. The devise comes within the provisions of the Rev. Sts. c. 59, § 9. Richardson v. Wheatland, 7 Met. 169. Weld v. Williams, 13 Met. 486. The power conferred on the tenant for life to dispose of the estate by will did not affect the nature of the estate which passed to her children. This power not having been exercised, their estate took effect absolutely secundum formam doni. It was defeasible only on an event which did not take place. The case does not raise the question whether the remainder vested at the death of the testatrix, or was contingent until the death of the tenant for life. If the devise had been to “ the heirs ” of the first taker, its construction would have been open to grave doubt. Richardson v. Wheatland, ubi supra. But by the gift of the remainder to the children of her daughter, with a distinct declaration that “ all her children ” are to take, a clear intent is manifested to create a vested remainder in those born after as well as before her death. To carry into effect such intent the remainder must be held to be capable of opening to admit afterborn children. Bowers v. Porter, 4 Pick. 198. By virtue of the Rev. Sts. c. 62, § 24, the issue of the daughter’s son by her first marriage, who died before the testatrix, took his share. Our opinion of the construction and effect of this devise accords with that given to it by the supreme court of Rhode Island in Moore v. Dimond, 5 R. I. 121. Exceptions overruled.

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