Greer v. Salmon’s Empirical Analysis
1970
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 16 district · 24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson (2003), 176 W. Va. 638 - McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek (1986)
2 federal appellate · 16 district · 24 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. · Terry v. Humphreys · Morriss v. First Nat. Bank of Mission · Berry v. J. C. Penney Co. · Woodson Oil Company v. Pruett
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ ‘[T]he provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order to avoid termination of the lease ... ’ Restoration of production in paying quantities within that period obviates the need to drill ...” 725 P.2d at 277 (quoting Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (Emphasis in original).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The language of th[ese] clause[s] clearly supports this construction. Furthermore, this construction seems in accord with the intent of the parties and sound policy. Upon termination of the lessee’s estate, he is relieved of further obligations under the covenants of the lease. The primary purpose of the lease clearly is to obtain production. It would, therefore, seem in accord with this objective as embodied in the language of the habendum clause that the duration of the lessee’s interest, after a period of exploration, be limited by the continued use of his interest for the purpose for which that interest was created. While the courts may be generally opposed to a construction that results in an automatic termination, the policy behind this rule is not applicable to an oil and gas lease. The special limitation placed on the duration of the lessee’s interest is not a friv olous collateral condition or a whimsical limitation on the use of the interest. Furthermore, the limitation placed upon the lessee’s interest is in accord with public policy, since upon the termination of the lessee’s interest, new arrangements may be made for the development and production of the natural resources. The characterization of the ‘thereafter’ clause as a special limitation is also desirable in that the parties can usually proceed with certainty as to whether the lease has terminated or not. ... Equitable rules against forfeiture have no application when the ‘thereafter’ clause is characterize”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“If, at the expiration of the primary term, oil, liquid hydrocarbons, gas or their respective constituent products, or any of them, is not being produced on said land or land pooled therewith but lessee is then engaged in operations for drilling, mining, or reworking of any well or wells thereon, this lease shall remain in force so long as such operations or said additional operations are commenced and prosecuted * * * with no cessation of more than sixty (60) consecutive days, and, if they result in production, so long thereafter as oil, liquid hydrocarbons, gas or their respective constituent products, or any of them, is produced from said land or land pooled therewith (emphasis added).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.