Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 federal appellate · 15 district · 57 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 148 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““This action is not brought upon the covenants of the lease. It is in trespass 'for injuries to the buildings of the plaintiff, and the' gist of the action is the negligence of the defendants. Unless that be established, they are not liable. 'The mere fact that injury has been caused is not sufficient to hold them. No 'one' is responsible for injuries resulting from unavoidable accident while engaged in a lawful business. A party charging negligence as a ground of action must prove- it. He must show that the defendant by his act, or by his omission, has violated some duty incumbent upon him, which has caused the injury complained of. The cases between passengers and carriers for injuries stand upon a different footing. The contract of the carrier being to carry safely, the proof of the injury usually establishes a prima facie case, which the carrier must overcome. His contract is shown, prima facie, at least, to have been violated by the injury. Outside of these cases, in which a positive obligation is .cast upon the carrier to perform safely a special service, the presumption is that the party has exercised such care as men of ordinary prudence and caution would exercise under similar circumstances, and, if he has not, the plaintiff 'must prove it. Here no such proof was made, and the case stands as one of unavoidable accident, for the consequences of which the defendants are not ■responsible. The consequences of all such accidents must be borne by the sufferer as his misfor”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Garrett v. Southern Ry. Co. · Leahy v. Detroit, M. & T. Short Line Ry.

2. ““The rule deducihle from them is that the measure of care against accident, which one must take to avoid responsibility, is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to he affected, and the whole risk were his" own.” 14 Am. & Eng. Ene. 936.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jennings v. Davis · Almy v. Cotton Bros.

3. “[The appellants] are not insurers of their patients against injury, but are only required to use ordinary, reasonable care and diligence in the treatment and care of their patients. The degree of care should be in proportion to the needs of the patient under all of the facts and circumstances. * * * * * * * "Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably prudent person, under the same circumstances, would not do; or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do, under the same circumstances, activated by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. * * * * * * * "You will note that the person whose conduct is set up as a standard is not some exceptional person. It is not a person peculiarly endowed with qualities of perfection or an exceptionally skillful person, but it is a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. * * * * * * * "Therefore, in order to arrive at a fair standard, we ask: What conduct might have been expected of a person of ordinary prudence under the same circumstances?”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Washington Hospital Center v. Robert Butler, Administrator of the Estate of Beatrice H. Butler, Deceased, James E. Wissler v. Robert Butler, Administrator of the Estate of Beatrice H. Butler, Deceased