Lindsey v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis
820 F.2d 1137 · 1987
Citation profile
55 federal appellate · 21 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 127 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2023 · most notably Clisby v. Jones (1992), United States v. Forbes (1987)
55 federal appellate · 21 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Batson v. Kentucky · Johnson v. Zerbst · United States v. Bagley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 127 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Based on their own past experience in reviewing capital punishment cases, state appellate courts `can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom the death penalty is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not,' Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 [ 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 ] (1984), without listing in their opinions the facts that did or did not justify the imposition of the death penalty in prior cases."”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Isaac ... demonstrates that the considerations of comity that underlie the procedural bar doctrine require federal habeas courts to honor state procedural rules, and not only state courts' procedural rulings.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"[T]here are especially compelling reasons for allowing the trial judge to exercise broad discretion in deciding whether or not 'manifest necessity' justifies a discharge of the jury. On the one hand, if he discharges the jury when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the defendant is deprived of his 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' But if he fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors. If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate court views the 'necessity' for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling, would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. *Page 876 Such a rule would frustrate the public interest in just judgments. The trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing court."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.