Richard Earl McFadden Sr. v. D.A. Garraghty, Warden’s Empirical Analysis
820 F.2d 654 · 1987
Citation profile
23 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently June 2013 · most notably 585 So. 2d 660 - Willie v. State (1991), United States v. Glover (1997)
23 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Johnson v. Zerbst · Edwards v. Arizona · Colorado v. Connelly · Oregon v. Elstad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Although appellant was taken into custody by the Amherst County Sheriff’s Department on both the evening of April 30 and the afternoon of May 1, the interrogation by the Nelson and Augusta deputies was removed in time and place from the magistrate’s office where he originally had been questioned. The Nelson and Augusta deputies adequately advised appellant of his Miranda rights. He was interrogated by separate and distinct law enforcement authorities, about different crimes. Of even greater import, however, is that appellant was not subjected to continuous custody. There were two breaks in custody which serve amply to sever any causal link between the initial unlawful interrogation and appellant’s voluntary confessions.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Edwards is premised on the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation and is designed to prevent the authorities from badgering a suspect in custody after the suspect has invoked his Miranda right to have an attorney present during questioning. Therefore,... in order for Edwards to apply, the suspect must be in custody from the time he invokes his right to the time when the subsequent interrogation is initiated. If custody is broken, especially for a lengthy period of time, the inherently coercive nature of custody itself is diminished and there is little to no risk of badgering by the authorities. This is not to say that the police can circumvent Edwards by temporarily releasing a suspect for a short period of time and then reacquiring him. Whether a break in custody is sufficient to remove a suspect's request for counsel from the ambit of Edwards must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. [ Ibid. (citations omitted).]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. [Such accused] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.