820 So. 2d 886 - Arthur v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘We agree with Judge Hard’s order concerning this argument: “‘Arthur contends that the two-year statute of limitations in Rule 32 is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. While in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus, Rule 32 is, in fact, a procedural mechanism for seeking post-conviction relief and is promulgated under the rule making authority of the Alabama Supreme Court. Legal procedures such as Rule 32 are subject to reasonable procedural restrictions without such restrictions being a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-664 , 116 S.Ct. 2333 , 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996). The two-year statute of limitations for raising constitutional claims in post-conviction proceedings is certainly a reasonable restriction and serves the purpose of requiring that constitutional claims be presented in a reasonable time in order to achieve the meaningful result of finality of criminal judgments.’ “Arthur’s interpretation of Aabama’s Rule 32 proceedings contradicts the express words of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), where that Court stated: “ ‘Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 [, 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 ] (1963). It is a collateral att”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hodges v. State

2. “"Federal habeas corpus proceedings, similar to our Rule 32 proceedings, has a one-year specified time limitation period within which a state inmate may file for federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and other federal circuits have recognized that `"[section 2244] permits equitable tolling `when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.'" Steed v. Head , 219 F.3d 1298 , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandvik v. United States , 177 F.3d 1269 , 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).' Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections , 226 F.3d 1213 , 1216 (11th Cir. 2000). This State has never, insofar as we can ascertain, recognized any exception to the filing deadline in Rule 32.2(c) ."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte State of Alabama

3. “"Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides, in pertinent part: "`[T]he court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1 (a) and (f), unless the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, [Ala.] R.App. P....'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 847 So. 2d 386 - Ex Parte Hutcherson