Patrick v. Miresso’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Given this irreconcilability, and bearing in mind our supreme court’s pronouncement that “it is the legislature, not the courts, that is in the best position to determine the nature and extent to which governmental units in Indiana should be insulated from tort liability,” Benton , 721 N.E,2d at 232, we make the following observations: We have the advantage of a set of well-settled principles in construing statutes, albeit there is not total consistency in these rules. Basic to these rules is that in construing a statute we must give effect to the intention of the legislature which enacted the law. It is also a familiar rule of statutory construction that two statutes dealing with a common subject matter will be read in pari materia and so as to harmonize and give effect to each. There is also a presumption that the legislature in enacting a particular piece of legislation has in mind existing statutes on the same subject. Where the statutes cannot be harmonized or reconciled, some cases emphasize that the more specific or detailed statute should prevail over the more general statute; others emphasize that the most recent expression of the legislature shall prevail over older ones. It is also recognized that general statutes or rules do not overrule or supersede specific , provisions in statutes or rules unless it is clear there was an intent to do so. Also, the repeal of statutes by implication is not a favored result in,this State and such a repeal will occur only if it is ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. East Chicago Police Department v. Bynum

2. “(a) This section applies to the person who drives an authorized emergency vehicle[ 8 ] when: (1) responding to an emergency call; (2) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law; or (3) responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm. (b) The person who drives an authorized emergency vehicle may do the following: (1) Park or stand, notwithstanding other provisions of this article. (2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as necessary for safe operation. (3) Exceed the maximum speed limits if the person who drives the vehicle does not endanger life or property. (4) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions. (c) This section applies to an authorized emergency vehicle only when the vehicle is using audible or visual signals as required by law. An authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle is not required to be equipped with or display red and blue lights visible from in front of the vehicle. (d) This section does not do the following: (1) Relieve the person who drives an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. (2) Protect the person who drives an authorized emergency vehicle from the consequences of the person’s reckless disregard for the safety of others.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. East Chicago Police Department v. Bynum

3. “In light of Benton and King , then, we must conclude that Quakenbush’s rationale for holding that Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8) does not provide law enforcement immunity under these circumstances [public duty v. private duty] is no longer controlling. With respect to this case, we interpret King as standing for the proposition that rather than de termine the nature of the duty that Appellants owed to [the plaintiff], we first determine whether Appellants’ activities fall within the law enforcement immunity provision of Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8) and then determine whether and to what extent this provision conflicts with Indiana Code Section 9-21-1-8. It seems clear that pursuing a fleeing burglary suspect constitutes enforcement of a law as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8). See King, 790 N.E.2d at 482 (stating that “ ‘enforcement’ of a law is an activity assigned to specific units of government[,]” such as “the police”); see also Quakenbush, 622 N.E.2d at 1287 n. 3 (recognizing “pursuit of suspects by police” as being among “traditional law enforcement activities”). Somewhat less clear is whether and to what extent Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8) conflicts with Indiana Code Section 9-21-1-8 and which expression of legislative intent controls in this situation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. East Chicago Police Department v. Bynum