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← 822 F.2d 16 - Ucc v. Celeryvale Transport Inc P Jahn

Ucc v. Celeryvale Transport Inc P Jahn’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

23
cited by 23 later decisions
2
states following
August 2007
most recently cited

2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently August 2007

2 state decisions

130198719902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co. · Coble Systems, Inc. v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc. (In Re Coors of the Cumberland, Inc.) · United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thompson & Green MacHinery Co. · Coode v. M & J Financial Corp. (In Re Boling) · Jahn v. M.W. Kellogg Co. (In Re Celeryvale Transport, Inc.)

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “... [t]he most illustrative test to distinguish between a true lease and a lease intended as security is whether the “lessee” is “obligated to accept and pay for the property or [instead] is obligated only to return or account for the property according to the terms of the lease from which he may be excused if he exercises his privilege of purchasing it.” If the former is true, then the lease is security instrument in a disguised sale, if the latter, then a true lease exists.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Commentators support the conclusion that the date of the transaction, rather than a future date, is the more appropriate point to determine the adequacy of the option price.... Intending a true lease, parties might at the outset select an option price that they believe will equal the fair market value of the property at the end of the lease. The value may be substantially higher or lower than their estimate when the lease ends. If the option were “nominal” at the conclusion of the lease (because the property had not depreciate ed as expected), but would have been equal to the fair price had the parties estimate proved true, should the agreement be termed a lease or security interest? We believe it should be termed a lease. Parties make the agreement at the outset. It is only there that they have the common intention to create a lease or security agreement, and it is at that time we should measure the economic realities to determine their true intention---- The courts have not always been careful to distinguish between the predicted value established at the outset and the actual value to determine the economic realities; our view is supported by the newly proposed uniform law on leasing[,] U.C.C. Article 2A and the amendments to section 1-201 (307).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.