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← 823 So. 2d 917 - State v. Johnson

823 So. 2d 917 - State v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

2002

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
2
states following
April 2022
most recently cited

13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently April 2022

13 state decisions

80200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · Beck v. Alabama · Schmuck v. United States · Schad v. Arizona · Keeble v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Tjhough the jury’s plenary power of compromise does not altogether preclude harmless-error analysis when a trial court has erred with respect to charging lesser and included offenses, it does place that analysis beyond a purely quantitative measure of the evidence presented at trial. Harmless-error analysis may apply in a case in which a trial judge inadvertently omits one or more responsive verdicts or lesser included offenses but includes others in its jury charge and the jury rejects a compromise by returning a verdict of guilty as charged.... However, in Louisiana, a trial judge has no authority to decide unilaterally that an instruction on lesser and included offenses is not necessary because overwhelming evidence exists to convict the defendant on the crime charged and reasonable jurors therefore could not rationally acquit on the greater offense but could convict on a lesser offense. The court has limited authority to exclude those statutory responsive verdicts provided for specific offenses by La.C.Cr.P. art. 814(A) only when those verdicts are not supported by the evidence in a particular case. La.C.Cr.P. art. 814(C); cf. [State v.] Porter, 98-1106 at 9, [ (La.7/5/94),] 639 So.2d [1137] at 1142 (option of striking particular statutory responsive verdicts is “not designed to give trial courts and prosecutors the option to strike a lesser offense as a responsive verdict in order to prevent the jury from returning a compromise verdict ... supported by the evidence, eve”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “A. (1) Battery of a police officer is a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police officer acting in the performance of his duty. * * * B. (3) If the battery produces an injury that requires medical attention, the offender shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than one year nor more than five years, or both.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “The crime of battery of a police officer is generally a six month misdemeanor offense. La. R.S. 14:34.2(B)(1). However, the crime becomes a felony, and thereby entitles a defendant to a jury trial if it is committed within a correctional facility, La. R.S. 14:34.2(B)(2), or if it produces injury that requires medical attention. La. R.S. 14:34.2(B)(3).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.