Stone v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

164 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 164 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he court views all the evidence without the prism of “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Because the court is not bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it may consider the testimony of defense witnesses and the existence of alternative hypotheses. The court should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Johnson v. State · Graham v. State

2. “We conclude the Court of Appeals was correct in this respect, and the appropriate scope of the Clewis criminal factual sufficiency review does, in fact, encompass both formulations utilized in civil jurisprudence, i.e., that evidence can be factually insufficient if (1) it is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence. Because the State always carries the burden of proof to establish the elements of a criminal offense at trial, an appellant’s points of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the elements of the charged offense could claim that the evidence used to establish the adverse finding was so weak as to be factually insufficient. This is the most equitable approach, especially given the fact criminal defendants are not under any obligation to present evidence on their behalf and usually rely, instead, on forcing the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, in the event a defendant does muster contrary evidence, this standard of review allows him, if he so chooses, to present the argument on appeal that his evidence greatly outweighed the State’s evidence to the extent that the contrary finding is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. We hold, therefore, that our opinion in Clems is to be read as adopting the complete civil factual sufficiency formulation. Borrowing in part from Justice Vance’s concurring opini”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Roberson v. State · Watson v. State

3. “Meraz was specifically directed to a factual sufficiency review involving matters in which the defendant has the burden of proof. A situation that is also present here. We emphasize that we do not express any view here as to whether our holding in Meraz is limited to those cases where the defendant has the burden of proof, or whether Meraz permits the courts of appeals to engage in a factual sufficiency review of the elements of an offense.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Prieto v. State · Smith v. State