¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶2I agree that Tex.R.App.P. 53(d) requires the defendant to provide either an agreed statement of facts or a statement of facts which contains the entire record of the trial before the fact finder, in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
¶3I. THE DISPOSITION IN STACY.
¶4In Stacy, the State appealed the trial judge’s order granting Stacy’s motions for new trial. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5). However, the State failed to provide a complete statement of facts for the appellate court to review the trial judge’s decision. The Court of Appeals denied, as untimely filed, the State’s motions to file a complete statement of facts and delivered its opinion. State v. Stacy, 796 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1990). Shortly thereafter, in a case of first impression, we interpreted Tex. R.App.P. 54(b) to provide the State with 120 days, from the date of an order granting a defendant’s motion for new trial, to file a statement of facts for appeal. State v. Daniels, 806 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Therefore, relying on our opinion in Daniels, we vacated the judgment and remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals, without a request from either party. Stacy v. State, 819 S.W.2d at 861 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
¶5II. THE DISPOSITION TODAY.
¶6In the instant case, we granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to interpret Rule 53(d).
¶7The majority should be consistent and remand the case. To affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, without first providing appellant an opportunity to pursue his appeal, is, in my opinion, patently unfair. In Stacy, we allowed the State to provide the Court of Appeals with a belated statement of facts, even though the State did not request such relief. Whereas, in the instant case, appellant, in good faith and believing to be in full compliance with Rule 53(d), attempted to perfect a limited appeal.
¶8We should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to consider appellant’s eighth point of error if the appellant timely provides the Court of Appeals with either an agreed statement of facts or a statement of facts which contains the entire record of the trial before the fact finder. Because the majority fails to do so, I dissent.
¶9. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis herein is supplied by the author.
¶10. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 53(d) as requiring an appellant to bring forward the entire record in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and affirmed the judgement of the trial court. Greenwood v. State, 802 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
¶11. Both the Court of Appeals and the State concede that this is case of first impression. Greenwood, 802 S.W.2d at 13, State's Appellate Brief on Petition for Discretionary Review, pg. 2.
¶12. The State concedes that appellant followed the plain language of Rule 53(d).