Barbour v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[F]rom this evidence the jury could have reasonably believed from appellant's testimony that by sticking the victim, Palmer, he did not intend to kill him, but that his conduct disclosed a mental state of wantonness manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. It is also reasonable to infer from the act of sticking the victim in the chest that appellant intended to kill him, but it is just as reasonable to infer (as appellant testified) that he did not intend to cause the victim's death. Such inference is factually supported by appellant's testimony that when he withdrew the knife from his pocket, that he did so only to scare Palmer. We reason, based upon this record, that a juror could have reasonably found that appellant's conduct was so wanton as to manifest an extreme indifference to human life. Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 932 (1983). The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on wanton murder. . . . Thus, under the instructions as given, and before a jury could convict appellant of wanton murder, it was necessary to find Barbour not only guilty of wanton murder, i.e. that he engaged in wanton conduct which caused the death of the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, but additionally that appellant was not privileged to act in self-protection. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McGinnis v. Commonwealth

2. “"In Shannon , we recognized that an individual may intentionally commit murder while acting under a wanton or reckless belief, and that the actor's subjective belief may be unreasonable when viewed by an objective standard. Shannon, supra at 550-51 . . . . If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant's claimed need for self-defense is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it becomes a complete defense. However, if the justification is not reasonable, then the defendant can only be convicted under Shannon of either the offenses of manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide, depending upon the jury's determination of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the act. Shannon, supra at 552 . . . . [T]he gist of the reasoning is that `[a] subjective belief in the need for self-defense, which is objectively wanton or reckless, is a `circumstance' falling within the definition of wanton or reckless behavior, punishable under Manslaughter II or Reckless Homicide. . . .' Id. at 551-52 ."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McGinnis v. Commonwealth

3. “Self-protection is unavailable as a defense to wanton conduct as Shannon v. Commonwealth, [Ky., 767 S.W.2d 548 (1988) ], clearly provides that a self-protection instruction is unavailable as a defense to wanton conduct. While it was error to give such an instruction, it redounded to the benefit rather than to the detriment of appellant. Thus, under the instructions as given, and before a jury could convict appellant of wanton murder, it was necessary to find Barbour not only guilty of wanton murder, i.e. that he engaged in wanton conduct which caused the death of the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, but additionally that appellant was not privileged to act in self-protection.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Runion