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← 825 A2D 743 - Commonwealth v. Percudani

Commonwealth v. Percudani’s Empirical Analysis

2003

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
1
states following
September 2018
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 16 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc. · 450 Pa. Super. 393 - DiLucido v. Terminix International, Inc. · 438 Pa. Super. 78 - Berger v. Rinaldi · 2002 Pa. Super. 140 - Skurnowicz v. Lucci · 2000 Pa. Super. 112 - Booze v. Allstate Insurance Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “This Court has not addressed the 1996 amendments to the Law [UTPCPL] and their effect on pleading fraud under Section 2(4)(xxi). In our research, we have uncovered two divergent views. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has issued several opinions after the 1996 amendments in which it continues to state that a plaintiff must allege the elements of common law fraud in order to recover under the catchall provisions of Section 2(4)(xxi) .... Conversely, several decisions of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have rejected the Superior Court’s adherence to the pre-1996 pleadings requirement.... In Rodriguez v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 218 B.R. 764 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1998) ... the Bankruptcy Court rejected the pre-1996 pleadings requirements noting that the Legislature’s addition of the words 'or deceptive conduct' signals an approval of a less restrictive interpretation of the law and affirms the Supreme Court's position that the Law [UTPCPL ] should be liberally construed. In Flores [v. Shapiro & Kreisman, 246 F.Supp.2d 427 (E.D.Pa.2002) ] the Bankruptcy Court ... noted that maintaining the pre-1996 pleading requirements would render the words ‘or deceptive conduct’ redundant and superfluous, which is contrary to the rules of statutory construction .... Prior to 1996, the Law [UTPCPL] merely prohibited 'other fraudulent conduct.’ The Legislature’s intervention in 1996 in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Law [UTPCPL] is to be liberally c”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Prior to the 1996 amendments to the [UTPCPL], [Sjection 2(4)(xxi) [of the UTPCPL] merely prohibited ‘fraudulent conduct,’ and a plaintiff had to establish the elements of common law fraud to prove a claim. [Percudani ]. The 1996 amendments revised the provision to prohibit ‘fraudulent or deceptive conduct.’ Id. Even after the 1996 amendments became effective, our [S]uperior [C]ourt has continued to interpret [S]ection 2(4)(xxi) [of the UTPCPL] to require that a plaintiff establish the elements of common law fraud to prove a claim. Id. However, this court has rejected that interpretation because: (1) the statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative goal of consumer protection; (2) the legislature’s addition of the words ‘or deceptive’ signals a less restrictive interpretation; and (3) maintaining the pre-1996 requirement would render the words ‘or deceptive conduct’ redundant and superfluous, contrary to the rules of statutory construction. Id. The question, then, is not whether a company or corporate officer engaged in conduct that was intended to deceive consumers. Rather, the question is whether the company or corporate officer engaged in conduct that might be ‘deceptive to the ordinary consumer.’ Id. at 746.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.