In Re Jam. J.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, the trial court must make a finding on the record that testifying would create a risk of serious harm to the child. . . . Second, if the trial court finds that the child is at risk of serious harm from having to testify, the court must consider whether the risk can be alleviated by means short of prohibiting the testimony altogether. . . . Third, after taking into consideration the risk of harm to the child and the possibility of ameliorative measures, the court must evaluate the prohibitive value of the child's testimony and the parent's concomitant need for it.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. In Re KS · In Re Ml

2. ““Appellate court decisions from other jurisdictions offer us further guidance. Several state courts have addressed the scope of a parent’s right to compel a child to testify in a neglect or other civil proceeding concerning that child’s welfare when it is claimed that testifying would be contrary to the child’s best interests. Broadly speaking, the decisions fall into two groups. Some courts have held that trial judges have no authority to preclude a child’s otherwise competent testimony on the ground that testifying might injure the child. See, e.g., Bebee v. Hargrove, 607 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); White v. White, 655 N.E.2d 523, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); In re Faircloth, 137 N.C. App. 311 , 527 S.E.2d 679, 683 (2000); Callicott v. Callicott, 364 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963). Other courts have held that judges do have the authority to subordinate the parent’s interest and exclude a child’s testimony when there is substantial evidence that the child would be harmed by having to testify. See, e.g, In re Jennifer J., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1080 , 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 , 819 (1992); In re Brandon W., 56 Conn. App. 418 , 747 A.2d 526, 531-32 (2000); R.S.M. v. J.D.M., 542 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); In re Beasley, 314 Or. 444 , 840 P.2d 78, 84 (1992); In re Child M., 452 Pa. Super. 230 , 681 A.2d 793, 798 (1996).” 825 A.2d at 913 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re the Marriage of Allen · In Re KS

3. “[t]he potential importance to the parent of being able to elicit the child's live testimony is heightened where . . . the proof of neglect depends critically on the admission of accusatory statements that the child herself made outside of the courtroom.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rb v. Usepa · In Re DB