Wheeler v. Hurdman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

86 federal appellate · 93 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 257 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]f the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the [plaintiff's] case.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Zerr v. Johnson · Johnson v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

2. “(1) the kind of occupation at issue, with reference to whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the employer or the employee furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Golden v. A.P. Orleans, Inc. · Brackens v. Best Cabs, Inc.

3. “As we stated at the outset, this is a case of statutory interpretation. There are statutory limitations to the argument that the remedial ends of the Acts justify as means any definition of employee which results in coverage. The underlying theme of the [plaintiff’s argument] is that discrimination itself defines the application of the Acts. Thus, all partnerships must be under the Acts_ To suggest that Congress intended the provisions of Title VII [and the other Antidiscrimination Statutes] ... to reach all situations where discrimination may arise in a business setting is to suggest that it enacted these statutes with the intent that they cover all individuals having an economic relationship with a business. This would make employee status largely irrelevant and would essentially transform the employment discrimination statutes into business discrimination statutes. If this were the case, then we must question why Congress bothered to limit each statute’s reach to employment practices. The requirement that the statutes cover only employment situations suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the application of these statutes. The word “employee,” however broadly defined, is still “employee,” and circumscribed by meanings reasonably related to that word. Drafters of the statute gave no indication that they were departing from the common discourse of the republic when fashioning a law to be understood by and applied to its citizens.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hull v. Rose, Schmidt, Hasley & DiSalle P.C. · 776 F. Supp. 391 - Grantham v. Beatrice Co.