Coppage v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Although the evidence of Coppage’s prior conviction does not meet the requirements for admission under N.D.R.Ev. 609 because the conviction was for a misdemeanor, the rule does not apply because the evidence was not offered to impeach Coppage’s general character for truthfulness. The court did not consider whether the evidence was properly admitted for other reasons, including whether Coppage “opened the door” and the evidence was admissible to contradict his testimony and whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice under N.D.R.Ev. 403. Furthermore, the court also did not correctly apply the law in determining whether Coppage was prejudiced by his counsel’s conduct. The court found Coppage’s trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to request an instruction limiting the jury’s use of the evidence of Coppage’s prior conviction. The court further found Coppage was prejudiced by his counsel’s conduct because the evidence was improperly admitted and the admission prejudiced Coppage. However, that is not the correct standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.... The court did not assess the prejudicial effect of counsel’s error within the context of the remaining evidence and the overall conduct of the trial. On remand, the court must consider the error in the context of the properly presented evidence and overall conduct of the trial and determine whether Coppage establ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Coppage v. State

2. “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must first overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Kruckenberg [v. State], 2012 ND 162, ¶ 10 , 820 N.W.2d 314 . Evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior convictions generally is not admissible and we have “ ‘warned of the dangers inherent in allowing evidence of other acts to show propensity and of tempting a jury to convict a defendant for actions other than the charged misconduct.’ ” State v. Schmeets, 2009 ND 163, ¶ 15 , 772 N.W.2d 623 (quoting State v. Ramsey, 2005 ND 42, ¶ 19 , 692 N.W.2d 498 ). “ ‘[A] criminal defendant faces the unique risk that juries will use prior convictions as evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, rather than considering the convictions for impeachment purposes.’ ” State v. Stewart, 2002 ND 102, ¶ 7 , 646 N.W.2d 712 (quoting State v. Randall, 2002 ND 16, ¶ 13 , 639 N.W.2d 439 ). When the prior conviction is similar to the crime charged the danger is heightened. Stewart , at ¶ 8. An instruction limiting the jury’s use of the evidence is generally sufficient to remove the prejudice and limit the danger to the defendant. Laib [v. State], 2005 ND 187, ¶ 13 , 705 N.W.2d 845 ; State v. Hernandez, 2005 ND 214, ¶ 24 , 707 N.W.2d 449 ; see also State v. Aabrekke, 2011 ND 131, ¶ 15 , 800 N.W.2d 284 (because of the inherent dangers in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and the court’s”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Coppage v. State

3. “In accord with the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel bears the heavy burden of proving (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. The defendant must first overcome the “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s representation fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and courts must consciously attempt to limit the distorting effect of hindsight. Heckelsmiller [v. State, 2004 ND 191, ¶ 3 , 687 N.W.2d 454 ]; Ernst v. State, 2004 ND 152, ¶ 9 , 683 N.W.2d 891 . To meet the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test the defendant carries the heavy burden of establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defendant must prove not only that counsel’s assistance was ineffective, but must specify how and where trial counsel was incompetent and the probable different result. Unless counsel’s errors are so blatantly and obviously prejudicial that they would in all cases, regardless of the other evidence presented, create a reasonable probability of a different result, the prejudicial effect of counsel’s errors must be assessed within the context of the remaining evidence properly presented and the overall conduct of the trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Coppage v. State