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← 827 F.2d 1108 - United States v. Griffin

United States v. Griffin’s Empirical Analysis

827 F.2d 1108 · 1987

Citation profile

74
cited by 74 later decisions
12
states following
March 2022
most recently cited

48 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently March 2022 · most notably United States v. Nesbitt (1988), United States v. Spears (1992)

48 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions — followed in 12 states

43019871990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3013 · 18 U.S.C. § 3742 · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Illinois v. Gates · Glasser v. United States · Jones v. United States · United States v. Ventresca

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a magistrate's determination of probable cause is to be given considerable weight and should be overruled only when the supporting affidavit, read as a whole in a realistic and common sense manner, does not allege specific facts and circumstances from which the magistrate could reasonably conclude that the items sought to be seized are associated with the crime and located in the place indicated.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ ‘[I]t is perfectly legitimate to prove a conspiracy by circumstantial evidence.’ [ United States v. Griffin, 827 F.2d 1108 , 1116 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied [— U.S. -] 108 S.Ct. 1085 [ 99 L.Ed.2d 243 ] (1988) ]. By its very nature, a conspiracy ‘is conceived and carried out clandestinely, and direct evidence of the crime is rarely available. Thus, circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer the existence of an agreement is permissible.’ [United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084 , 1088 (7th Cir.1983) ] (quoting United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 , 1153 (7th Cir.1978) (sic)). See also United States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771 , 780 (7th Cir.1986) (‘Circumstantial evidence is of equal probative value to direct evidence’).””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Once a conspiracy is shown to exist evidence that establishes a particular defendant’s participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between defendant and conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict_ [M]ere association, knowledge or approval of a conspiracy is not sufficient to prove a defendant’s guilt. However, while ‘mere presence at the scene of the crime or mere association with conspirators will not themselves support a conspiracy conviction ... presence of a single act will suffice if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.’ ””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.