dissent">MATHIAS, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the majority's determination imposes subjective conditions beyond the scope of the statute that reasonable citizens could not and would not anticipate.

The statute provides that license plates must be "iJn a place and position that are clearly visible" and "maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible[.]" Ind.Code § 9-18-2-26(b)(3) and (4) (emphasis added). The statute requires only that the license plates be maintained in a condition such *444that one could read the information. See Cash v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ind. Ct.App.1992) (aim of statute to assure that information "be readily discernible").

Here, the officer stated that he could and did see the license plate or temporary tag after he initiated the stop at 12:30 a.m.; thus, it was "clearly visible," or at least as visible as a temporary tag positioned in the rear window of a vehicle can be at that early hour of the morning. The condition of the license plate and whether it was free from foreign materials, the only objective standards imposed by the statute with regard to legibility, are completely undisclosed by the record before us.

Without clear direction by the General Assembly as to the objectively proper manner to display a temporary tag, I do not believe we as a court should unilaterally outlaw what is clearly a common practice throughout the State: display of a paper-based temporary tag in the rear window of a vehicle in order to protect it from deterioration by the elements during the grace period to obtain a durable metal license plate. Indeed, such display appears to be Hoosier, common-sense compliance with the statute's core requirements to maintain the license plate (and by extension the temporary tag) in a condition to be clearly legible. I.C. § 9-18-2-26(b)(4).

In Cask, we noted that the officer had "imposed subjective conditions plainly beyond the scope of the regulation, criteria which a reasonable citizen cannot be expected to anticipate when he sets out to conform his conduct" to the statutory requirements. Cask, 593 N.E.2d at 1269. There, we rejected the officer's interpretation that the statute required "a license plate to be centered, secured with more than one bolt or hung on a bracket[.]" Id.

Under the facts and circumstances before us, there was no evidence that the placement or condition of the temporary tag offended the statutory requirements for visibility or legibility of license plates. I would therefore affirm the trial court's determination to suppress the evidence seized following the stop of Phillips' vehicle that was based solely upon the purported violation concerning Phillips' temporary tag.

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