Davis v. Kemp’s Empirical Analysis
829 F.2d 1522 · 1987
Citation profile
25 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 46 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2019 · most notably Withrow v. Williams (1993), United States v. Chandler (1993)
25 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Wainwright v. Sykes · Donnelly v. DeChristoforo
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The death penalty is called for. Ask yourselves this question, how would you feel living in this community if you looked out of your window one night and saw [the defendant] walking down the street coming up toward your house. If that wouldn’t put a feeling of cold terror in your heart, what would?”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Generally the court engages in a two-step process in determining whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief based upon a prosecutor’s argument. First, we consider whether the prosecutor’s arguments were improper. Second, we consider whether any arguments found improper were so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. As we noted in Brooks [v. Kemp], 762 F.2d 1383, 1400 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 , 106 S.Ct. 3325 , 92 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986) [re-instated on remand, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 , 107 S.Ct. 3240 , 97 L.Ed.2d 744 (1987) ], it is not our duty to ask whether a particular remark was unfair; we are concerned with whether it rendered the entire trial unfair.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“A legitimate future dangerousness argument is not rendered improper merely because the prosecutor refers to possible victims.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.