83 Cal. App. 2d 241 - Baker Divide Mining Co. v. Maxfield’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The third contention of appellant is that the court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction in evidence of the notice of default which was signed by the transferees of the stock who were not the stockholders who signed the original option agreement. The objection was based upon the claim that the notice was fatally defective because it was not signed by the original optionors, and further because it notified appellant to pay past due payments to the transferees of the stock. “As hereinbefore stated, appellant gave his written consent to the transfer of half the shares to Crummey and thereby, surely at least Crummey was authorized to sign the notice. Furthermore, appellant was not injured but favored by the notice. It gave him more than 30 days to cure his default under his option agreement and he did nothing about it; he took no action nor did he make any offer to anyone to perform, despite the fact that he was then woefully in default. Whether signed by the original shareholders or their transferees, the notice conformed to the requirements of the option agreement and appellant should have taken some action within the more than 30 days allowed him.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Maxfield v. Burtt

2. ““. . . appellant argues that ‘the most fatal omission in giving the 30-day notice was the failure to tender the stock when the demand was made for the entire balance of the purchase price. ’ Since appellant did nothing after the receipt of the notice, it seems obvious that a tender of the stock would have been useless. There is nothing in paragraph 10 creating a reciprocal obligation; it merely provides that the optionors shall give appellant 30 days to cure ‘his’ default, and there is no provision calling upon optionors to tender the shares of stock as a condition precedent to payment. “In McClintick v. Leonards, 103 Cal.App. 768, 773 [ 285 P. 351 ], the court said: ‘If an offer of performance of an obligation be defective, the offeree must object on that ground or the defect is waived and he cannot be heard to urge such objection in a subsequent suit (Lockhart v. J. H. McDougalCo., 190 Cal. 308 [ 212 P. 1 ]).’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Maxfield v. Burtt