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83 F.3d 427

Docket No. 95-35499.

Holterman

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted April 10, 1996.* Decided April 12, 1996.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently June 1997 · most notably Anwar v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1997), Anwar v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1997)

34 federal appellate ·

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Hernandez v. New York · Cruz v. Beto · Federal Deposit Insurance v. Henderson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

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NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Before: HALL, THOMPSON, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

¶1

MEMORANDUM

¶2

Daniel Lee Holterman and Paul Julian Maney appeal pro se the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging racially-discriminatory cell-assignment practices. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

¶3

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. ("FDIC") v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir.1991).

¶4

Holterman and Maney contend that the district court erred by finding that they had not presented sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination by defendants. This contention lacks merit.

¶5

Prisoners have a right not be assigned to cells in a racially-discriminatory fashion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on such a claim, however, prisoners must provide evidence of racially-discriminatory intent or purpose. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991); FDIC, 940 F.2d at 471.

¶6

Defendants presented evidence to show that Holterman and Maney were separated for medical and security reasons. Upon a review of this record, we conclude that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning defendants' racially-discriminatory intent in separating plaintiffs. See FDIC, 940 F.2d at 471. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants. See id.

¶7

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

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