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← 83 Haw. 28 - Dunlea v. Dappen

Dunlea v. Dappen’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

54
cited by 54 later decisions
4
states following
May 2012
most recently cited

9 district · 44 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 54 later decisions — most recently May 2012 · most notably 189 Ill. 2d 603 - Clay v. Kuhl (2000), Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union v. Keka (2000)

9 district · 44 state decisions

310199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Olitsky · Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Investment Co. · Sikes v. Bancboston Mortgage Corp. · Baehr v. Lewin · Pele Defense Fund v. Paty

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(e) (1990). “A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.” Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61 , 647 P.2d 713, 716 (1982) (citations omitted).”
    13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher [actual malice where the plaintiff is a public figure]; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.