Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

83 Ky. 190

Frey v. Commonwealth

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Decided September 12, 1885

Court of Appeals of Kentucky · decided 1885-09-12

Case 27 — INDICTMENT— APPEAL EROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT. 1. Where the punishment imposed by a statute is upon the person alone committing the offense, and not in general terms upon those' who are guilty, mere aiders and abettors are n.ot within the act. (Stamper v. Commonwealth, 7 Bush, 613.) 2. The indictment is bad, because it does not charge the guilt of the' principal except inferentially. (Tully v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 154.) 3.

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1929

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The statute making accessories before the fact liable as principals, was designed to apply only in cases where the offense existed at the common law, or where created by statute, applies to all who are guilty.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Baker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1885-09-12

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

JUDGE PRYOR

¶1delivered the opieioh of the court.

¶2If the rule laid down in Stamper v. The Commonwealth, 7 Bush, 613, is to be followed, the judgment' of conviction in the present case must be reversed.. Where a statute creates a felony, and annexes a punishment common to all persons who may be guilty of the offense, those aiding or abetting in the perpetration of the crime are included in the statute, and may be indicted. This is the rule of the common law, and was recognized as the correct doctrine-in the case referred to. The punishment fixed by the statute in this class of cases is imposed on the-woman concealing, or endeavoring to conceal, the-birth of her bastard child, so as it could not well be ascertained whether the child was born dead or-alive. In such cases, and for the purpose of preventing the mother, from concealing the evidence of' her shame by destroying her offspring, it is provided that, when guilty of the offense, “she (the-mother) shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years.” The punishment was intended to apply alone to the mother, the statute providing: “If any woman be delivered, of any issue of her body, which being born alive would be- a bastard, shall endeavor privately, by *192drowning or secretly burying the same, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, to conceal the birth thereof, so that it may not be known whether it were born aliye or not, she shall be confined,” etc.

¶3An aider or abettor, if the child was born alive and concealed so that death ensued, would be guilty of murder as well as the mother; but the difficulty in determining the question as to whether the child was or not born alive, induced the passage of the statute inflicting a punishment on the mother who ■ endeavors to conceal its birth.

¶4Section 10, article 1, chapter 29, General Statutes, . making accessories before the fact liable as principals, was designed to apply only in cases where the ■offense existed at the common law, or where created by statute, applies to all who are guilty. The father ■of a bastard child concealing it is not amenable to the statute, but would be subjected to a greater punishment if the concealment, or the attempt to ■ conceal its birth, caused its death. Stamper was in- • dieted for malicious shooting and wounding another, without causing death. The statute made it a felony, but the court held that, being present aiding ..and abetting only in the shooting, the actual perpetrator of the offense could alone be convicted under the statute. That statute provided that “if an y per- ■ son shall willfully or maliciously shoot at, etc., he -shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ■ one nor more than five years.” That décision hav- ' ing been the recognized rule in this State for so long a period, it is unnecessary now to inquire whether or not that decision was a proper solution ■of the question involved in this case.

¶5*193While the decided preponderance of the testimony ■favors the innocence of the accused, this court has mo power to disturb the verdict upon that ground. The jury and the trial court, where there is any evidence of guilt, are the sole judges upon the issue of fact.

¶6For the reason indicated the judgment below is reversed, with directions to dismiss the indictment.

/83/ky/190 · .json · Public domain