<p>1. —Murder—Self-defense—Provoking Difficulty—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence raised the issue of provoking the difficulty, the court properly submitted a charge thereon. j</p> <p>2. —Same—Manslaughter—Charge of Court—Provoking Difficulty.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence raised the issue of manslaughter | as well as provoking the difficulty, and the court submitted a proper charge upon these issues, there was no reversible error. Following Woodward v. State, 54 Texas Crim. Rep., 86.</p> <p>3. —Same—Converse Proposition—Abandonment of Difficulty.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, defendant contended that the case was sub- | mitted to the jury from the State’s standpoint alone, with reference to provoking the difficulty, and that the converse of the proposition was not embodied in , the court’s charge, and that the evidence showed an abandonment of the dif- | ficulty, but the record showed on appeal that the court’s charge was correct'and otherwise followed approved precedent, there was no reversible error. Following Cox v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 427, and other cases.</p> <p>4. —Same—Charge of Court—Rule Stated. ,</p> <p>■ Where defendant relies on self-defense and upon communicated threats ac- Í companied by an overt act and not on an actual attack, the court’s charge on self-defense should be accompanied by and connected with a charge on the law of threats, but where an actual attack is shown, as in the instant case, such ¡ charge is not required; besides, no special charge was requested. Following Chalk v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 116, and other cases.</p> <p>5. —Same—Charge of Court—Undue Repetition.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the State’s requested charge was submitted, of which defendant complained as being a repetition unduly emphasizing the r proposition that there were shots fired after the necessity erased, and as not giving the converse of the proposition involved therein, and as omitting altogether the subject of manslaughter, yet, where the record on appeal showed ¡ that the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and the charge of the court was otherwise correct under the evidence, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>6. —Same—Attorney and Client—Agreement Between Counsel—Evidence.,</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, the record showed on appeal, that before the trial an agreement was made by the attorneys of both parties that the examining trial ! testimony wfould be Available to the respective parties on the trial, and the record on appeal showed that this testimony and not said agreement was introduced in evidence without objection, there was no violation of the rule that an attorney has no implied authority to make an agreement with opposite counsel with reference to the introduction of testimony which is prejudicial to the accused, and there was no reversible error. Following Pollock v. State, '60 Texas Crim. Rep., 265, and other eases.</p> <p>7. —Same—Evidence—General Reputation—Argument of Counsel.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the defendant complained of the cross-examination of his witnesses as to defendant’s reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding man, and also to the argument of State’s counsel with reference thereto, and the record on appeal showed a conviction for manslaughter, and that the examination of the witnesses in this case was legitimate, and that the argument of State’s counsel was invited by the defense, and that there were no requests for special instructions to disregard these, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>8. —Same—Motion for Rehearing—Self-defense—-Carrying Pistol.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence suggested that the meeting of the parties was unexpected and that defendant had the right to carry a pistol as a traveler, the court should have submitted the defendant’s requested charge, in connection with the court’s charge limiting defendant’s right of self-defense on provoking the difficulty, that the jury would not be authorized to draw an inference adverse to the defendant from his possession of the pistol at the time of the encounter. Following Shannon v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 2, and other cases.</p> <p>9. —Same—Provoking Difficulty—Abandonment.</p> <p>See opinion, Davidson, Presiding Judge, that while the defendant is acquitted of" murder, yet if the trial court should undertake in the next trial to charge upon the issue of provoking the difficulty, he should also charge on the law of abandonment of the difficulty if the evidence is the same, and not permit too-great a latitude in cross-examination in impeaching the character of the defendant as a law-abiding man.</p>
