Wager v. Hall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 federal appellate · 21 district · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But if it appears that the debtor giving the preference, whether a merchant or trading company, was actually insolvent, and that the means of knowledge upon the subject were at hand, and that such facts and circumstances were known to the creditors securing the preference as clearly ought to have put him, as a prudent man, upon inquiry, it would seem to be a just rule of law to hold that he had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, if it appears that he might have ascertained the fact by reasonable inquiry. Ordinary prudence is required of a creditor under such circumstances, and, if he fails to investigate when put upon inquiry, he is chargeable with all the knowledge it is reasonable to suppose he would have acquired if he had performed his duty.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Eggert · Crandall v. Coats

2. ““Insolvency, in the sense of the bankrupt act, means that the party whose business affairs are in question is unable to pay his debts as they become due in the ordinary course of his daily transactions, and a creditor may be said to have reasonable cause to believe his debtor to be insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to his notice respecting the affair® and pecuniary condition of his debtor, in a case like the present, as would lead a prudent business man to the conclusion that he (the debtor) is unable to meet his obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of -business. Such a party (that is, a creditor securing a preference from his debtor over the other creditors of the debtor) cannot be said to have had reasonable cause to believe that his debtor was insolvent at the time, unless such was the fact, but if it appears that the debtor giving the preference, whether a merchant or trading company, was actually insolvent, and that the means of knowledge upon the subject were at hand, and that such facts and circumstances were known to the creditor securing the preference as clearly ought to have put him, as a prudent man, upon inquiry, it would seem to be a just rule of law to hold that he had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, . if it appears that he might have ascertained the fact by reasonable inquiry. Ordinary prudence is required of a creditor under such circumstances, and, if he fails to investigate when put upon inquiry, he is c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Eggert

3. ““The transfer by a debtor who is insolvent of his property, or a considerable portion of it, to one creditor as a security for a pre-existing debt, without making any provision' for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, operates as a preference to such transferee, and must be taken as prima facie evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor or transferee can show that the debtor was at the time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts; and that a transfer by an insolvent debtor of his property, or any considerable portion, with a view to secure it to one creditor, and thus prevent an equal distribution among all his creditors, is a transfer in fraud of the bankrupt act.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bloch v. Farjeon