United States v. Roy’s Empirical Analysis
830 F.2d 628 · 1987
Citation profile
29 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 54 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2019 · most notably Alabama v. Michael Herman Bozeman (2001), Alabama v. Bozeman (2001)
29 federal appellate · 14 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 17 · 18 U.S.C. § 20 · 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Bail Reform Act of 1984) · 18 U.S.C. § 751
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Newman Oil Co. · O’Callahan v. Parker, Warden · Angrist v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A]cquittal on the charges for which the defendant was held in custody at the time of the escape is not a defense to the escape charge under 18 U.S.C. § 751 (a).”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[N]either the regularity of [a defendant's] arrest nor the propriety of his confinement can be tested by an act of escape.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In construing a statute or similar legislative work product, we must construe it to effectuate the overall legislative intent. Moreover, we must construe a legislative enactment in such a manner as to give effect to all of its provisions. In accomplishing this task, we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage. * * * When we read the IAD according to this methodology, we cannot accept Mr. Roy's interpretation of the IAD for several reasons. First, if tolling under article VI required that the procedures set forth in article III be followed, there would be no reason to have two separate provisions. Article III already provides (as does article IV) for the granting of continuances. Unless article VI performs a distinct function, it is mere surplusage. Second, that distinct function is quite apparent from the structure of the IAD. The continuance provisions of article III and article IV are designed to permit the courts of the receiving state to postpone trial when the interests of justice make such a continuance "necessary or reasonable." The "good cause" must be shown in open court in order to ensure that the delay does not work to the detriment of the substantial rights of the prisoner. On the other hand, the continuance clause of article VI is designed to perform another function. It exempts from the governance of the IAD time when the prisoner is "unable to stand trial." It is easy to conceiv”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.