Conn v. State

¶1dissenting.

¶2Article 3 of the IAD states that "for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." Ind.Code § 85-33-10-4 (emphasis added). The record indicates that good cause was shown in open court for the granting of the indefinite continuance on November 10,12 that Conn was present, that the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter, and that the continuance was nee-essary. That is all that is required under the statute, and Conn's convictions should therefore stand.

¶3The trial court's resetting of the trial date was simply that-a resetting, not the granting of a second continuance. As such, neither Conn nor his counsel was required to be present in open court." The trial court might not have followed through with its assurance to Conn to reconvene once his counsel was located, but that does not amount to a violation of the IAD. The majority suggests that a defendant has a right to "query" the trial court as to the necessity or reasonableness of the length of a continuance, but I find no support for this suggestion in the IAD. I believe that determination rests solely within the trial court's discretion. Cf. Young v. State, 765 N.E.2d 678, 676 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (stating that speedy trial continuance due to court congestion must be for "a reasonable time" pursuant to Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B) and that trial court's "determination of a reasonable delay is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."). Conn has shown, and I have found, no abuse of that discretion here. The majority suggests that a defendant bears the burden of proving the unreasonableness of a continuance. See op. at 831 n. 6. I believe that Conn has failed to meet his burden here.

¶4It is important to note that defendants who seek an expedited trial pursuant to *835the IAD have already been found guilty and imprisoned in another jurisdiction, whereas many defendants who request a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 4 have only recently been jailed and have not yet been convicted of any crime. Thus, the respective liberty interests at stake are substantially different, as are the purposes of the respective rules. The decision reached by the majority contravenes the purposes of the IAD by placing defendants in the driver's seat when it comes to determining the necessity or reasonableness of a continuance. For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.